Posthuman Superheroes (Part 1): Posthuman Bodies and Genders

This is the first part of a four part essay dealing with posthuman superheroes. The superhero universe is full of characters that exhibit a wide range of posthuman features. With their abilities of shapeshifting and embodiment they are forms without form; characters which exhibit endless possibility and multiplicity. Using the work of Ihab Hassan, and the idea of embodiment as defined by Robert Pepperell, and Katherine Hayles, part one provides an overview of posthuman theory which include evolution of the human through mutation; and the idea of embodiment which theorises that the mind, body, and environment are a continuous entity. It then identifies a number of superheroes as having posthuman bodies and genders.

Part two ‘Performing Gender’ theorises Buffalo Bill from Silence of the Lambs as a negative ideal of a posthuman subject and analyses Martian Manhunter performing gender in two issues of Justice League Task Force.

Part three ‘Shapeshifters, Cyborgs, and Embodied Superheroes’ theorises the superhero characters, Mystique, Jean Grey, Apollo, Midnighter, The Engineer, and Jack Hawksmoor, as posthuman subjects.

Part four ‘Coming Off The Page’ investigates the growing real world emergence of the posthuman and the possibility of fostering a real world 'heroic imagination'.

In their editorial to the ‘Posthumanous’ issue of the journal, Reconstruction, Jason Smith, Ximena Gallardo, and Geoff Klock, write:

there is certainly no agreement as to what, exactly, constitutes posthumanism or a posthumanist position beyond the premise that what previously seemed to constitute the subject position of a “human being” has been threatened, infiltrated, deconstructed, or denatured (2004).

Even though there may be no consensus on posthumanism, there are several key theoretical concepts, that are, not the least for my discussion here, the most prevalent.

In his 1977 essay ‘Prometheus as Performer: Toward a Posthumanist Culture?’, Ihab Hassan echoes Michel Foucault’s claim that man as an invention of recent date is perhaps nearing its end (1973). In signalling the end of humanism, Hassan suggests:

We need first to understand that the human form – including desire and all its external representations – may be changing radically, and thus must be re-visioned. We need to understand that five hundred years of humanism may be coming to an end, as humanism transforms itself into something that we must helplessly call posthumanism (1977:212).

Although the essay seems to have been forgotten by current posthuman theorists – Hayles uses it only for quotation purposes – Hassan’s essay is for me a nexus from which the major strands of posthuman thought originate. Written in “scenes” using eight “textual voices”, Hassan’s succinct essay, covers much of the ground – evolution, consciousness, and human/machine hybrids – upon which the current posthumanist debate resides. These major strands of posthuman thought diverge from this essay, resurfacing and recombining years later as “new” theories on the subject including ideas that Robert Pepperell, author of The Posthuman Condition: Consciousness Beyond the Brain, uses twenty years later. Dealing more with the aspects of human consciousness than with the integration of human and machine which has come to dominate the posthuman debate, Hassan documents that posthumanist culture depends on ‘the growing intrusion of the human mind into nature and history, on the dematerialization of life and the conceptualization of existence’ (1977:205). Much like Francois Lyotard’s view that postmodernism is not an age, but ‘a mood or better, a state of mind’ (1986/87:209), Hassan’s posthumanism is that of a continual movement, an expanding of consciousness that happens, and has happened, throughout history; a performance in progress where ‘the languages of imagination and the languages of science have… crossed in certain epochs and certain great minds of the past’ (1977:207). Science and imagination are thus agents of change – their interplay as modes of representation and transformation, being vital performing principles in culture and consciousness (Hassan, 1977:208).

Robert Pepperell defines posthumanism as that which comes after humanism; the time dominated by the thought that humans are the measure of all things; the ‘long held belief in the infallibility of human power and the arrogant belief in our superiority and uniqueness’ (2003:171). This antagonistic/egocentric humanistic view results in humanity’s desire to dominate, control, and exploit nature. The emergence of movements that resist exploitative humanist behaviour – feminism, environmentalism, and animal rights – are the most evident of humanity moving towards a posthuman future. Incorporated in the humanistic view is the idea that scientific enquiry would prove the world, and indeed the universe, to be a gigantic machine, and once all the parts of this machine had been discovered and studied, then through logical reasoning, the future could be accurately predicted. Pepperell sees posthumanism germinating in three early twentieth century ideas – cubism; relativity theory; and quantum physics – which changed how the nature of reality was viewed and represented (2003:162). Specifically, seemingly stable reality became a ‘cluster of probabilities that mutate over time and which are dependent on the viewer for their perception’ (2003:166). The cubists’ role in this was the introduction of an ambiguous contingency into pictorial representation that was analogous to the uncertainty and paradox found in advanced physics (2003:166).

For Pepperell, the posthuman era begins proper when ‘we no longer find it necessary, or possible, to distinguish between humans and nature’ (Pepperell, 2003:161), shifting from ‘a universe of certainty and predictability to a universe of uncertainty and unpredictability’ (2003:167). While some posthuman debate tends towards the elimination, manipulation, or expendability of the body, Pepperell theorises about an expansive body through the dissolution of boundaries. Thus the idea of embedded consciousness – embodiment – drives his posthuman philosophy. Consciousness is the mind (as opposed to the brain as an organ) and body acting together – effectively we think with our whole body (2003:178). Pepperell argues that the human is identifiable, but not definable such that no finite division can be drawn between the environment, the body, and the brain. Our consciousness (mind) and environment (reality) cannot be separated and are therefore continuous (2003:178).


Posthuman – After the Human

The term posthuman is also used in an evolutionary sense, with differing definitions. One branch of posthuman thought posits that we have evolved enough to decide the direction in which we are to evolve. A definitive, and somewhat idealist, explanation of this facet of posthumanism is put forward by Nick Bostrom:

A posthuman is a human descendent who has been augmented to such a degree as to be no longer human… your mental and physical abilities would far surpass those of any unaugmented human. You would be smarter than any human genius and be able to remember things much more easily. Our body will not be susceptible to disease and it will not deteriorate with age… you may have a greatly expanded capacity to feel emotions and to experience pleasure and love and artistic beauty. You would not need to feel tired, bored or irritated about petty things (in Graham, 2002:159)

This level of enhancement says that if more is better, then lots more must be much better. Opponents to the engineering of human evolution point to the dehumanising effect it may have on the human subject, undermining dignity and eroding the fuzzy value of what it is to be human. There is also the threat posthumans might pose to “ordinary” humans (Bostrom, 2005: 204). Though as Michael Akerib (2007) writes, the means and availability of procedures to attain a posthuman state of this kind would inevitably be restricted, initially, to a chosen few, which is essentially no different to the liberal humanist conception that:

may have applied, at best, to that fraction of humanity who had wealth, power, and leisure to conceptualize themselves as autonomous beings exercising their will through individual agency and choice (Hayles, 1999:286).

Like claims that postmodernism is simply the natural extension of modernism (high or late modernism), the posthuman could also be claimed to simply extend the ideas of the humanist agenda – progress, self-improvement, individualism (Graham, 2002:153), of which all three can be applied to the posthuman ideal. Thus the domination of technology is achieved by incorporating technology into our(selves), allowing a complete mental mastery over prosthetic devices. These machines/augmentations, such as artificial prosthesis, literally respond to our commands, our thoughts. Again opponents point out that this progress could actually be harmful to the human subject/psyche and is therefore not progress at all.


Posthuman Bodies, Posthuman Gender

For Judith Halberstam and Ira Livingstone posthuman bodies ‘emerge at nodes where bodies, bodies of discourse, and discourse of bodies intersect to foreclose any easy distinction between actor and stage, between sender/receiver, channel, code, message, context’ (1995:2). A posthuman body is ‘a technology, a screen, a projected image… a contaminated body, a deadly body, a techno-body… a queer body’ (Halberstam & Livingstone, 1995:3). They are ‘causes and effects of postmodern relations of power and pleasure, virtuality and reality, sex and its consequences’ (Halberstam & Livingstone, 1995:3). This suggests the posthuman body, using the metaphor of space in this context, simply occupies space(s). Similar to Pepperell’s use of uncertainty, Halberstam and Livingstone elicit the uncertain posthuman concepts of gender, race, and sexuality, through the idea of someness:

How many races, genders, sexualities are there? Some. How many are you? Some. “Some” is not an indefinite number awaiting a more accurate measurement, but a rigorous theoretical mandate whose specification… is neither numerable nor, in the common sense, innumerable (1995:9).

Here is a posthuman ideal set out – the idea of uncertainty of which Pepperell writes – where some number of genders, race, and sexualities are embraced. Succinctly, by keeping the number uncertain then none can be excluded nor when another mode is invented/rehashed/reincarnated, will there be a conflict because there is always, and can only be, some. The posthuman being is always a multiplicity. There is neither one nor other, object or subject, but at the same time, also both. Therefore, the posthuman body:

vibrates across and among an assemblage of semi-autonomous collectivities it knows it can never either be coextensive with nor altogether separate from. The posthuman body is not driven… by a teleological desire for domination, death or stasis; or to become coherent and unitary; or even to explode into more disjointed multiplicities. Driven by the double impossibility and prerequisite to become other and to become itself, the posthuman body intrigues rather than desires; it is intrigued and intriguing just as it is queer: not as an identity but because it queers (Halberstam & Livingstone, 1995:14).

Posthuman genders ‘include any and all former “unnameables”… and any other “transgressive” gender practices’ (Smith, Klock, & Gallardo, 2004). The reasoning is simply that these gender types have assaulted and undermined the two-sex model and thereby what it means to be human (Smith, Klock, & Gallardo, 2004). While I don’t feel this term posthuman gender is particularly relevant – they are hardly “post” anything and have always been labelled – there is something to be said for their increasing representation in the traditional white/male/heterosexual space of superhero comics. Thus we have the emergence of previously unnameable posthuman genders becoming named, starting with the Marvel Comics character, Northstar, who openly declared his gay sexuality. The trend continues to The Invisibles’s Lord Fanny (a Brazilian transvestite shaman, though more correctly she is transgender), and culminates with Apollo and Midnighter of The Authority, who engage in an openly gay and committed relationship; who get married; and adopt a baby. The posthuman superhero narrative is not that of Dr Fredric Wertham’s implied undercurrent of homosexuality (which in itself implies that there is no place for homosexuality in comics) in his diatribe, Seduction of the Innocent. Rather, the posthuman superhero narrative is that of The Authority which sees homosexuality function at full volume, where the two most powerful characters on the team openly make out with each other (Klock, 2002:143). The fact that Apollo and Midnighter are deliberate tropes of Superman and Batman actually turns Wertham’s argument against itself. Why not make the two most powerful representations of superheroes gay? As a representation of a committed gay couple, Apollo and Midnighter show readers what is possible and present, dare I say, a normative picture of homosexuality. On the other hand, as two of the most powerful humans on Earth, they can basically do what they want without any worry of social reprisal, a situation which is perhaps difficult to replicate in the “real” world. I recall here the X-Men character, Beast, being unwilling to correct the impression that he is gay in New X-Men #134: ‘I’ve been taunted all my life for my individualistic looks and style of dress… I’m as gay as the next mutant’ (Morrison et al, 2005:14). Incorrectly Beast equates gay sexuality with the surface quality of mode of dress – a matter of performance. Assuming that it doesn’t matter whether he is gay or not, which of course can be seen as a positive representation of homosexuality, this is perhaps something only someone of a heterosexual identity could say. Like Apollo and Midnighter, Beast has the ability to repel any attacks that might occur in the event that his ruse is revealed. His is a position of power, mainly physical, even though as a mutant he is relegated to society’s margins.

Read Part Two: Performing Gender

Read Part Three: Shapeshifters, Cyborgs, and Embodied Superheroes

Read Part Four: Coming Off the Page

Reference

Bostrom, N. (2005) ‘In Defence of Posthuman Dignity’ Bioethics 19, 3, pp. 202-14.

Akerib, M. (25 July 2007) ‘Towards a Post-Human World?’,
http://clubofamsterdam.blogspot.com/2007/07/towards-post-human-world.html (Accessed 11 Oct 2007).

Graham, E.L. (2002). Representations of the Post/Human: Monsters, Aliens and Others in Popular Culture, New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press.

Halberstam, J. & Livingstone, I. (1995). Posthuman Bodies, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

Hassan, I. ‘Prometheus as Performer: Toward a Posthumanist Culture’ in Benamou, M. and Caramello, C. (eds) (1977). Performance in Postmodern Culture, University of Wisconsin – Milwaulkee: Coda Press, pp. 201-20.

Hayles, N. K. (1999). How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.

Klock, G. (2002). How to Read Superhero Comics and Why, New York, London: Continuum.

Lyotard, J. (1986-7). ‘Rules and Paradoxes and Svelte Appendix.’ Trans. Brian Massumi, Cultural Critique 5, pp. 209-19.

Morrison, G. (w), Quitely, F. with Grant, K. (p) and Avalon Studios (i). ‘Kid Ω’ New X-Men #134 in Morrison, G. (w), Quitely, F. with Grant, K. (p) and Avalon Studios (i) (2005). New X-Men Vol. 4: Riot at Xavier’s, [Collecting 2003 ‘New X-Men’ #134-138] New York: Marvel Publishing.

Pepperell, R. (2000). ‘The Posthuman Conception of Consciousness: A 10-point Guide’, http://robertpepperell.com/papers/The%20Posthuman%20Conception.pdf, (Accessed 16 Oct 2007).

Pepperell, R. (2003). The Posthuman Condition: Consciousness Beyond the Brain, Bristol, et al: Intellect.

Smith, C. J., Klock, G and Gallardo, X. (2004). ‘Introduction: Posthumanous’ Reconstruction 4, 3, http://reconstruction.eserver.org/043/Klock.htm (Accessed 11 Oct 2007).